Monetising Mozambique’s gas

By Ian Simm

Mozambique is home to some of to the largest gas finds made in recent years – “large enough to satisfy 10 trains of LNG and several domestic mega-projects,” according to the country’s gas master plan.

Neighbouring Tanzania has also made finds that, while dwarfed by those of Mozambique, are significant in their own right. Added together, and coupled with considerable recent oil strikes in Uganda and Kenya, they have drawn a great deal of attention to East Africa.

Indeed, at October’s East Africa Oil and Gas Summit held in London, a great deal of excitement surrounded the presentation of Tavares Martinho, exploration manager for Mozambique’s state-owned Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH), who noted that out of the 23 wells drilled in the country, only two were not considered commercially viable.

Of a total of 170 trillion cubic feet (4.8 trillion cubic metres) of Mozambican gas, around 100 tcf (2.8 tcm) is recoverable, and with further exploration, the total reserves could reach 200-250 tcf (5.7-7 tcm). High hopes indeed.

With numbers like these being trumpeted, it is no wonder that industry executives and commentators alike have spoken of Mozambique becoming a regional energy hub. The discovery of oil, while not commercially viable, has given hope that the area may also hold liquid hydrocarbons.

And north of the border, several major finds have taken total Tanzanian gas reserves up to around 33 tcf (935 bcm).

Reserves

The largest of Mozambique’s finds have been made in Areas 1 and 4. In offshore Area 1 – which covers around 2.6 million acres (10,683 square km) in the deepwater Rovuma Basin – operator Anadarko and its partners have drilled 11 successful wells.

Nine of these were in the Prosperidade complex, and the other two are located in the Golfinho/Atum complex. Prosperidade holds 17-30 tcf (481-850 bcm) or more of estimated recoverable resources.

Golfinho, which was discovered in May 2012, is located around 32 km northwest of Prosperidade, and was followed by the Atum discovery in June. The complex is estimated to hold 10-30 tcf (283-850 bcm) of recoverable gas.

Anadarko holds an operating 36.5% working interest in Area 1, and is partnered by Mitsui E&P Mozambique Area 1 (20%), BPRL Ventures Mozambique (10%), Videocon Mozambique Rovuma 1 (10%) and Cove Energy Mozambique Rovuma Offshore (8.5%), while ENH holds a 15% interest, which  is carried through the exploration phase.

To the east, Italy’s Eni and its partners discovered the Mamba complex in late 2011. Located in the 17,646-square km Area 4, Mamba is thought to hold 30 tcf (850 bcm) or more of gas in place.

Eni is the operator of Area 4 with a 70% stake, and is joined by Portugal’s Galp Energia (10%), South Korea’s KOGAS (10%) and ENH (10%, carried through the exploration phase).

 

Big difference

While gas looks likely to present a prosperous future for both Tanzania and Mozambique, David Ledesma, an independent strategy and LNG consultant at South Court, told me in early February that the differences were stark. “Tanzania has quite a lot of gas, while Mozambique’s reserves are vast.”

“It is important to note that the amount of gas in Mozambique is so great that it can do what it wants,” he said, noting that Mozambique’s gas consumption is negligible compared to its reserves, and that the country can therefore export vast quantities. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Mozambique’s population of 22.9 million people consumed only 18 bcf (510 million cubic metres) per day of gas and 109,000 barrels per day of oil in 2011. Clearly Mozambique has enough gas to cater to local demand without putting much of a dent in the volume it can put to other uses. Indeed, Ledesma said: “There is the ability to utilise all forms of gas monetisation.”

Putting it to use

Unsurprisingly, most of the talk about the monetisation of Mozambique’s gas has been focused on LNG.

According to the country’s gas master plan, the first train is expected to come on line in 2018, with two further trains coming on line every two years, reaching a total of 10 trains by around 2028. This would put it on a par with current LNG export champion Qatar, which ships around 77 million tonnes per year.

Ledesma noted that while Mozambique’s resource was sufficient to provide for 10 trains, the number of major LNG projects slated to come on line in the coming decade worldwide would bring fierce supply competition.

Mozambique’s location puts it at an advantage for providing gas to Asian markets, but large Australian LNG projects will also be competing there. The US shale gale, which changed the face of the global LNG markets, is also likely to provide cheaper gas than Mozambique, while progress in China’s shale gas sector could also pose a challenge further down the line.

Mozambique has already received industry requests for a total of more than 790 bcf (22.4 bcm) per year of gas as feedstock for projects in countries including Japan, South Africa, South Korea, Germany, Norway and India. (See table)

Downstream demands

Obviously, most of Mozambique’s gas will be exported. But that begs the question, how will the remainder be processed to meet domestic needs best?

In its Middle Africa Annual Outlook for 2013 – released last week, Ecobank said: “Demand for refined products across the entire African continent is likely to rise by up to 40% to 4.3 million barrels [per day] in 2020, from just 3 million barrels 5 years ago. This will equate to roughly an annual average growth rate of between 3-4%.”

It added: “East Africa’s downstream market consumes about 328,000 bpd of petroleum products annually, and should witness a 4.5% increase to 342,000 bpd in 2013,” with diesel representing nearly 50% of the 156,000 bpd of refined products consumed in southern Africa.

“We do not expect any new capacity to be added [to southern African refining] in 2013, though a handful of refinery construction projects could start this year. One such project is the construction of Mozambique’s 350,000 bpd refinery, likely to commence in 2013 but not due for completion before 2015.”

Gas-to-liquids (GTL) technology has been mooted, but Ledesma told me that while “it would work in practice,” costs would likely prove too high for it to be viable. GTL plants tend to be large and expensive – like Qatar’s US$19 billion 140,000 bpd Pearl GTL project in Ras Laffan. However, South Africa’s Sasol has indicated that smaller plants could be profitable in Mozambique.

According to the gas master plan, if GTL were to come into play, it “could displace imports and open up regional African markets for transportation fuel.”

Power, petchems and problems

In addition to LNG and GTL, Maputo has said that we can expect to see gas-powered plants, fertiliser plants and methanol units appearing around the country. The master plan says that 150-200 MW gas-powered plants will be used for local markets and to add voltage support for the grid.

Meanwhile, around 58 new fertiliser plants – producing urea – should be brought on line in the next few years, and while excess supply in potential export target countries could make it unprofitable, locally produced urea would reduce or eliminate ongoing imports for the Mozambican agriculture sector. It noted that, despite current oversupply, methanol output would be targeted at China.

Mozambique appears set to ride the gas boom and has the potential to give its economy a full overhaul. However, there will likely be issues with local content. According to the CIA World Factbook, 45.7% of the population is 0-14 years of age.

Combined with a literacy rate of 56.1% in those older than 15, this leaves us with a populace ill-equipped to work in the energy sector. Training will be forthcoming, however, and in the interim period it is likely that an immigrant workforce will be required to get the first LNG train running.

Qatar imported more than 100,000 workers in order to build its various projects. This could prove politically difficult in East Africa and is unlikely to be replicated. Like their counterparts in Tanzania – where demonstrations about a pipeline from Mtwara last week led to several deaths – Mozambicans will want to see the benefits from the country’s new-found riches.

This leaves questions about education, contracts and cultural differences.

However, Mozambique’s enormous potential is likely to tide it over and weather even the most contentious civil storm.

Europe pins hopes on opening Southern Gas Corridor

By Ian Simm

The European Union has made no secret of its desire to reduce its dependence on Russian gas imports, and the opening of the Southern Gas Corridor is seen as pivotal to weaning the bloc off Gazprom’s teat.

EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger last week said that opening the corridor was a priority and that 2013 would see a final decision made about the pipeline’s route as well as the final investment decision (FID) on the entire project.

Oettinger told Azeri news agency Trend: “The aim of the Commission has always been to open the Southern Gas Corridor for the EU in order to link directly and physically the EU gas market to the largest deposits of gas in the world in the Caspian Sea Basin and the Middle East.”

The plans currently centre on transporting gas from the second stage of Azerbaijan’s offshore Shah Deniz field (SD2) to Europe by pipeline.

Pipeline planning

The plan is first to pipe the gas through Turkey and to the doorstep of Southeast Europe via the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which has an initial capacity of 16 billion cubic metres.

From there it will be piped into the heart of Europe; however, the decision has yet to be made about the route it will take. A decision is expected to be made by June, but Trend has reported that Shah Deniz gas may not reach Europe until 2019.

BP, the operator of Shah Deniz, has identified the Nabucco West and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) – each designed to carry 10 bcm per year of gas – as the final candidates for deliveries to European customers. It is expected to select one of these shortlisted routes later this year.

In a recent interview with Bloomberg, Alasdair Cook, BP’s vice president for Shah Deniz development, said his company was dedicated to the TANAP project. He said that BP would sign a commercial agreement in the next few months.

Cook also indicated that BP’s entry into TANAP was part of a wider US$40 billion investment programme focused on SD2. In addition to this upstream development project, BP will also work to open a corridor for SD2 gas exports.

According to Cook, the super-major will oversee the expansion of the capacity of the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), which is currently pumping Shah Deniz Stage 1 (SD1) gas, from 9 bcm per year to 25 bcm per year. This will cost around US$25 billion.

The company will also participate in the construction of TANAP and a connecting pipeline into Europe. The governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey recently ratified an agreement on TANAP, which is set to carry a price tag of around US$10 billion. The pipeline project is currently split as follows: the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), the project’s operator with 80%; Turkey’s state pipeline operator Botas, with 15%, and Turkish Petroleum (TPAO), with 5%.

SOCAR has invited other members of the Shah Deniz consortium to join TANAP. It has offered 12% to BP – which the super-major announced in late January that it intended to buy – and hopes to transfer another 12% to Norway’s Statoil, which is in charge of marketing Shah Deniz gas. Meanwhile, it also intends to sell 5% to France’s Total.

These firms have also struck agreements with Nabucco Gas Pipeline International (NGP), the group backing the Nabucco West route for SD2 gas shipments to Central Europe, and TAP, which hopes to pump the gas across northern Greece and Albania into southern Italy. BP, Statoil and Total may eventually take as much as 50% in either pipeline, depending on which of the two wins the contract to transport gas from SD2 to Europe later this year.

BP and its Shah Deniz partners have promised to make a final decision on the issue in the second half of 2013. Gas from SD2, which will see output peak at 16 bcm per year, is now scheduled to flow in 2018.

The next phase of development will see the Azeri field produce an additional 16 bcm per year, bringing total output up to around 25 bcm per year. Around 10 bcm per year of SD2 output is slated for delivery to Europe – not enough to fill both Nabucco West and TAP.

However, it is not guaranteed that 10 bcm of SD2 gas will be available for Nabucco West/TAP owing to increasing Turkish demand.

Euro-Russian relations

Oettinger told Trend that the European Commission was neutral as to where the gas is piped to in Europe, adding that it equally supported both projects.

He said: “Our policy remains that we firstly want to see a dedicated pipeline to be built outside the EU, and if its capacity is limited at the start, it should be ensured [that it] legally and technically [can] increase [its] capacity to transport higher volumes at a later stage when these become available; and secondly, we want a clear and transparent legal framework for the pipeline, which would ensure uninterrupted gas supply to the EU.”

This brings us back to the EU’s issue with dependence on Russia. With the bloc in economic disarray, the sense of continuing to rebuff an increase in trade with Russia could be questioned.

Trade between Russia and Europe is currently worth more than 300 billion euros (US$393 billion) per year and Russia supplies Europe with around 20% of its gas.

In October 2012, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, the chairman of the Nord Stream gas pipeline consortium, was quoted by Deutsche Welle as saying: “If Europe wants to assert itself in global competition, this won’t work without Russian gas in particular”.

Nord Stream is a twin pipeline system that runs from Vyborg in Russia to Lubmin in Germany through the Baltic Sea. The pipelines cross the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Completed in April last year, the twin 1,224-km pipelines have a total capacity of 55 bcm, and will pipe gas to Europe for at least 50 years.

But there have already been reports that levels of Russian gas coming into Europe have not risen since Nord Stream’s inauguration, suggesting that the gas is being sent through Nord Stream instead of via Ukraine, where disputes over back payments have still to be fully resolved.

However, with Gazprom currently facing an anti-trust investigation from the EU regarding competition, it seems unlikely that the union will be in any hurry to strengthen ties.

When contacted about creating distance from Russia, the European Commission told me: “Russia will continue to be our partner in the future. Gas imports from Russia are not likely to decline in absolute numbers. We would like to diversify supply (more sources); this is why in addition to Russian partners it is our priority to get gas from Azerbaijan via TAP/Nabucco/TANAP.”

The Commission added: “Gas consumption in the EU will increase in the medium term – also as a back up or in addition to renewable energy because gas power plants can be turned on or off easily on demand. Gas from the Caspian region should cover this increase of demand.”

Russia’s answer to the SD2 pipe options, South Stream, is envisioned to pump Russian natural gas to Europe via the Black Sea and Balkans, bypassing transit countries like Ukraine. A rival to the Nabucco West and TAP projects, the US$39 billion venture will have an annual capacity of 63 bcm per year of gas. At the request of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Gazprom held a groundbreaking ceremony on Russia’s Black Sea Coast for the first link in the pipeline in December.

Putin has prioritised the project despite consensus among energy experts that it is too expensive and unnecessary, and he appears to be the driving force behind the project, with Gazprom signing related deals with other Balkan countries in recent months.

The EC told me: “South Stream has started construction on Russian territory only. On the EU territory, there is no final route decided and vital environmental impact assessment studies, which might take years, have not been carried out yet. South Stream is not a priority for the EU because it would most likely re-route Russian gas that currently is delivered via Ukraine.”

On February 25, Matt Bryza, director of the International Centre for Defence Studies (ICDS) and former US ambassador to Azerbaijan, told New Europe: “I think strategically knowing the people I do in Brussels and elsewhere that they would like it to be Nabucco. Nabucco was the flagship EU project. TAP wasn’t, Nabucco was. And there are other reasons why I think the EU overall people maybe on balance favour Nabucco West.”

“For example, the markets served by Nabucco West will be the ones that are most heavily dependent in Southeast Europe on one major supplier. That said, I also think the European Union will be absolutely fair, [and] will not pressure anyone on this.” The Shah Deniz consortium’s decision is eagerly awaited by both politicians and energy institutions throughout the region.

Both Brussels- and Moscow-backed projects for the Southern Gas Corridor are shrouded with at least some uncertainty. As the EU moves to make its energy ‘greener’, gas will play a pivotal role, and thus the demand for the new imports is likely to be there. However, with LNG export projects from major new gas discoveries – notably those in the Eastern Mediterranean and Mozambique, as well as Australia’s plethora of gas export facilities and ever increasing US unconventional output – there are plenty of options. It remains to be seen how competitive the price of gas transported through the Southern Corridor projects will be, but as the EU sees it, Europe needs secure supply of gas from non-Russian sources to protect it from geopolitical concerns about Gazprom’s role in Eastern Europe. Can you put a price on that? Brussels would apparently argue not.

The Fear Factor: why is AC Milan so afraid of Facebook?

Paulo Teixeira on Wednesday, 20 February 2013

According to Deloitte Football Money League 2013 report, AC Milan, sitting in eighth place, are the leading Italian club, collecting revenues of €256.9 million during the 2011/12 season.
Since 1986, the club has been under the grip of Fininvest s.p.a., one of the several companies owned by the Berlusconi family. When Silvio Berlusconi (77) took over, he enthroned Adriano Galliani (68) as general manager and former player Ariedo Braida (67) as sports director. Together, they sum up 212 years of age, almost twice the age of the club itself (114, founded in 1899). After 27 years in power, in retirement age, the Santissima Trinità (Holy Trinity), as it is known, is still going strong. A Holy Trinity hardly moving with the times, though, when it comes to understanding the power of social media.
As back-up for managerial purposes, the club can count on the loyal and unfailing support of a team composed of 10 consigliere (advisers). Among them, star attorney Leandro Cantamessa, who also runs AC Milan’s legal division.
Cantamessa and his crew are battling at FIFA a claim lodged by Brazilian club Botafogo FC for an unpaid training compensation of €300,000 – which represents roughly 3 days of subsistence allowance Berlusconi was ordered to pay to his former wife Veronica Lario by a Milan court in December 2012.
The flaws and blunders of the Ceregatti case have been exposed thoroughly on this page – which led to a complaint lodged by Cantamessa to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee on behalf of his client.
Astonishing as it may seem for a law firm of this standing, AC Milan requested FIFA - a private company, not a legal institution - “to prosecute Mr. Teixeira”. The club will surely have been disappointed when it heard of the action taken by FIFA - a 2-month suspension of my license. This however, was the maximum penalty football's governing body could wield without giving grounds for appeal. FIFA’s media department was swift to tweet their action under the headline: “First member of football family to be suspended/fined because of social media use”.
What is totally unknown to the public, however, is the negotiation that occurred backstage between the two clubs. Both parties now appear to be losers: Botafogo, desperately in need of the money; AC Milan, enduring the collateral image damage on the web.
“It’s better a bad deal than a good fight” exchanged the lawyers by email. But AC Milan’s settlement proposals, which you may partially read below, were totally out of proportion. Who could imagine that the most successful club in world football in terms of international trophies would suffer of this kind of Fear Factor?

Eyebrows up on Russian interest in Greek gas

By Ian Simm

As the privatisation of Greece’s Public Gas Corp. (DEPA) and its network subsidiary – the Hellenic Gas Transmission System Operator (DESFA) – enters its final stage, I decided to shed some light on a deal that is likely to be fraught with contention.

Last week, the Greek agency for privatisation (TAIPED) revealed the shortlist of five accepted bidders, which includes: Russian firms Gazprom and Negusneft, a subsidiary of Sintez Group; Greek firm M&M Gas; the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR); and the Czech PPF fund, in alliance with the Greek GEK-Terna.

While it has not yet been announced, I understand Gazprom has bid 900 million euros (US$1.2 billion) for DEPA; Negusneft has offered 1.9 billion euros (US$2.5 billion) for both companies; M&M Gas has bid around 450 million euros (US$599 million) for DEPA; SOCAR has offered a similar amount for DESFA and PPF GEK-Terna has bid around 400 million euros (US$532 million) for the network operator.

The competition will now move on to the due diligence phase, where the contenders will review the two Greek companies for sale, and in early April the binding bids will be submitted, with a decision expected in early May.

Fair competition?

Both TAIPED and the Greek Energy Ministry have given their assurance that all the shortlisted companies will be obliged to comply with EU competition regulations and with rules concerning energy security for the country, emphasising that “only the price tag involved will be taken into consideration regarding the privatisation process for here on.”

An advisor to the Greek Ministry of Industry and International Investments, Andreas Banoutsos, recently told me: “For the moment, Athens would be pleased if there [were] a delay in the process, since there are matters unresolved regarding the compliance of Gazprom and SOCAR with the EU’s competition rules, since they are both producers and sellers of the commodity, and in a market the size of Greece there could be accusations by Brussels concerning monopolistic practices.”

Similar views were expressed also by Sintez’s CEO, Andrey Korolev, who in a recent statement to the media predicted that Gazprom would face competition issues. He went on to say Sintez was the only bidder that regarded the Greek market as a potential energy hub, rather than just as a market to be monopolised.

An advisor to the Greek Prime Minister’s office for strategic planning, Alexandros Arvanitakis, told me: “Greece, according to many reliable studies, may contain substantial amounts of gas and oil, thus this privatisation is not merely an issue of gathering some amount of capital, but will also play an important role in the energy security of the country for years to come and decisions should be made carefully and without haste.”

Bones of contention

It is no wonder that the Russian bids have ruffled EU feathers, as gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz Second Stage has long been eyed by Brussels as the saviour from the latter’s growing dependence on Russia through the EU-backed but maligned Nabucco pipeline.

Russia’s South Stream project is a direct competitor to Nabucco, and while Brussels must still approve its route, Gazprom aims to pump 63 billion cubic metres per year of Russian natural gas to Europe via the Black Sea and the Balkans beginning in 2015.

Thus, while the EU seeks to vary gas supplies – or at least reduce Russian dominance – Gazprom is attempting to increase its footprint on the European gas market.

Pundits in Greece have mused recently that while Negusneft is privately held by backers who have previously clashed with the Kremlin, the firm is already in close co-operation with Gazprom, since the latter is the exclusive supplier of gas, on favourable terms, to Negusneft’s power stations in Russia. Therefore their participation in the privatisation appears to contain elements of an unfolding business alliance.

The Azeris, on the other hand, may hesitate to commit to the process before the final decisions on the route of the Southern Gas Corridor are made, due in March. Should the competing Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) be selected by the Shah Deniz consortium, its interest in DESFA is likely to increase, as the latter manages the Greek network. However, should Nabucco West – the scaled-down successor to Nabucco – be chosen, SOCAR would likely drop out, as the pipeline would bypass Greece entirely.

The US recently called on Greece to consider its options carefully, an implicit warning against accepting the Russian bids. When asked to comment on the developments, a US State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, said her administration had suggested it was in Greece’s interest to have varied supply sources so as not be held hostage over its natural gas trade. The statement is a clear shot across the bows of the bids by the two Russian firms. However, at this point, it appears that the Russian bids would be more favourable than the competing offers.

Significantly, Gazprom and its European partners, including Eni and Wintershall, broke ground on the US$16 billion South Stream on December 7, with Russian President Vladimir Putin brimming with pride. Putin has been central to the progress of the pipeline, and the December ceremony saw him come good on a promise to begin work on the pipeline before the end of the year.

“This event is important not only to Russia’s energy market, but for the entire European energy market … South Stream creates conditions for stable, unconditional deliveries of Russian gas to our main consumers in southern Europe,” said Putin.

While the stability of these deliveries may be questioned, it appears likely that as much as it may trouble the sceptics, Gazprom’s influence on the EU gas market is only set to grow.

South Stream Route

AC Milan, Anderlecht and the new 'joint venture'

by Paulo Teixeira on Wednesday, 14 November 2012

A few weeks back I got a text message from, let’s say, US soccer’s Obama. It read: “Are you pressing a training compensation claim against Milan? Do you want me to talk to Umberto?”
I was surprised both with the content of the sms and the time – 7.55 a.m. New York. Who was this Umberto, calling NY so early in the morning to run a check on me?
I googled the name and it popped up: Umberto Gandini, Organizing Director AC Milan, member of FIFA Committee for Club Football and 1st Vice-Chairman of the ECA (European Clubs Association)… Quite a heavyweight, by all standards.
The ECA is the organization that replaced the G-14. The G-14 was founded in September 2000 by 14 leading clubs to provide a unified voice in negotiations with UEFA and FIFA, then disbanded in 2008 and replaced by the ECA.
So, one the most powerful man in football seemed to be worried about my posts on Facebook. David and Goliah in modern times.
The ECA has nowadays 207 members from 53 Associations, all Europeans. What is less known however, is that an ‘organization’ within the organization has been created. Informally, of course. Let me call it ECAT (European Clubs Against Teixeira).
I’ll explain.
About a year ago I posted the case of Kabananga Junior, trained by a small Congolese club called Aigles Verts, which claims 100.000 euros but is yet to collect the training compensation due by RSC Anderlecht – one of the founders of the extinguished G-14. The Belgian club argued that Kabananga’s ‘contract’ in Congo – 250 CFA, that is, 20 cents euro/month – was already a pro one. I exposed that, the big shots from Parc Astrid felt offended and lodged a complaint at FIFA, on the basis of “perjury and defamation”. In the blink of an eye, FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee opened a proceeding.
When in June the SWINDLER’S LIST was published – topped by AC Milan, Botafogo FC (R. Preto, Brazil) claiming the amount of 300.000 euros as compensation for the education of the player Sergio Ceregatti - the well dressed executives in Via Turati went nuts. According to an insider, when the story broke AC Milan headquarters resembled Jody Foster’s Panic Room: they did not know what to do and, other than checking with US soccer’s Obama, they frantically consulted Anderlecht for advice.
At the end of the day, AC Milan opted for the easiest juridical pirouette: to ride on Anderlecht’s complaint. A ‘joint-venture’ was then born, both clubs – which budget nearly 300 millions euros /year - decided to take action together. In a matter of a week  (!) FIFA allowed AC Milan’s add-on. Nov 20 the case will be ‘judged’ by FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee, composed of 16 members.
I know two of them. One is the president of an Association which has illegally issued (sold?) at least one agent’s licence; the other runs an Association which allows transfers of players without ITC (International Transfer Certificate). That says a lot about the credibility of this chamber.
CNN’s John Sinnott, who wrote the story “Using Facebook to bounty-hunt football’s ‘disappeared’ players” (shortlisted for Sports Journalist of the Year in the UK), raised the question why the clubs did not go to a civil court on a “defamation/libel complaint” rather than take up the matter with FIFA.
Can't answer to that.
Now, pay attention to this: Aigles Verts’ complaint was lodged in October 2011. Officers at the Glass House in Zurich candidly maintain that ‘within 3 to 5 weeks a case is opened’. I checked with FIFA last month, that is, one year after. The officer in charge (the third one handling it) told me that she had just received the documentation and was not at all familiar with it, but she would come back to me as soon as. Of course, she did not.
Bottom line: Aigles Verts and Botafogo are neither AC Milan or Anderlecht. And my name is Teixeira, not Gandini.

Man City – the blueprint for foreign ownership?

Loathe it, like it, or love it, football is big business, and no league has attracted bigger business than the English Premiership.

A strong structure backed by mega TV deals and loyal supporters has made the English league arguably the world’s best. In recent years, we have seen more and more foreign owners of English clubs, with varying degrees of success.

There are few better examples of how foreign money talks in football than Chelsea’s rise from good to great after the investment of Roman Abramovich’s billions.

However, while Chelsea’s domestic success has been impressive, Abramovich is yet to achieve his dream of seeing the club win the European Champion’s League, Europe’s most important club competition.

In 2008, Abu Dhabi’s Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan bought Manchester City yet more oil-related money. Sheikh Mansour is part of the emirate’s influential royal family and sits atop the board of the International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) and First Gulf Bank. While Abramovich took investment in football clubs to a new level, Sheikh Mansour’s financial muscle far outweighs that of the Russian Oligarch.

It is hard to fault the Russian’s efforts, and while many have been vocal about how foreign ownership “spoils” the game, there can be no debating that it is here to stay.

Man City manager, Roberto Mancini is in the massively enviable position of having a near-inexhaustible fund behind him, and his investments are beginning to appear shrewd.

In the 2010-2011 season, City had spent vast amounts on players that took time to gel, and the team appeared defensive, negative and even dull. Speculation was rife that Mancini’s job was far from safe and Jose Mourinho’s name was bounced around by pundits and speculators as a possible replacement.

Midway through the season, City spent big on a big Bosnian. Edin Dzeko. Spending around 26 million euros, Mancini had picked up one of Europe’s hottest properties. However, Dzeko appeared cumbersome and did not fit the billing of his big-money move.

Other major signings like Nigel de Jong, and Kolo Toure offered little in the way of attacking flair, and the amounts paid for Joleon Lescott (GBP22 million+) and James Milner (GBP26 million) was scandalous. However, few would deny that the signings of Carlos Tevez and David Silva were astute no matter the price.

It was clear however, that City would spend big again this summer, and they did not disappoint. The most notable of their summer dealings was the capture of Arsenal’s Samir Nasri (GBP25 million) and Sergio Aguero (GBP35 million) from Athletico Madrid – two young players with excellent track records and astronomically high ceilings.

While City had made an excellent start to the season without the two, their impact has been immense.

Aguero has made his price tag appear a bargain, turning in a memorable Man of the Match debut substitute performance against lowly Swansea. The Argentine, Maradona’s son-in-law, clearly has what it takes to compete in, entertain, and at times, rip apart, the world’s most watched league.

City made their debut in the Champion’s League last week, drawing 1-1 at home with Napoli. While they may not have hit the ground running as quickly as some might have speculated, it is undoubtable that the players Mancini has brought in have the quality to make the step up.

Naysayers may claim that City have just thrown money at mercenaries – in the case of Ballotelli, this may be true – but the squad Mancini has built is prepared for whatever is thrown at it. They have at least two world-class players for every outfield position, and that is what sets City apart from the other teams who have tried to ‘buy’ European success.

Mourinho’s Chelsea team was built in a similar fashion, and as a Chelsea fan, I would argue that had it not been for a terrible refereeing decision against Liverpool, Abramovich could well have achieved his cherished prize by now. But Manchester City have invested very wisely in young, extremely talented players, showing their resolve by not balking at wage demands that proved too much of a barrier for Chelsea, Real Madrid, Barcelona or even city rivals Manchester United.

Sheikh Mansour and City have shown that they are serious about this ‘project,’ and while it pains me to say it, I think they will be dominant for years to come.

The important thing to learn from foreign ownership in football is that while in some cases, the ventures may be pet projects, for the fans of the clubs, it is vital that the investors show that they are serious.

Bhutan not so happy about phallic art!

A week or so ago, I noticed that the AFP had released this piece about modern Bhutan's embarrassment about "phallus art."
Now, don't get me wrong, I'm not a big fan of looking at male genitalia, but I do think that such (amusingly) graphic depictions, do go along very well with Bhutan's quirky image as the world's "Happiest Country."
Measuring social progression in terms of Gross National Happiness seems an excellent way of doing things, and judging by Bhutan's vast array of phallus art, lots of people seem to be enjoying themselves.
As the AFP piece says, the art reminds "people of ... the commonplace existence of sexual activity."

Apart from cartoon-like depictions of genitalia, what else does Bhutan have to offer?
Try these views on for size... I'm saving up already!