Why is Putin in Syria?

By Ian Simm

Russian airstrikes against anti-government and Islamist militants in Syria have brought into focus President Vladimir Putin’s intentions in the country.

With Syria home to a mere 2.5 billion barrels of oil reserves, small by Middle East standards, hydrocarbons do not figure to be of much relevance in this power play. Instead, the efforts to prop up the regime of Bashar al-Assad – opposing the line taken by the West, which has backed ‘moderate’ rebels – appear to be based in three major strategies: those of politics, defence and economics.

Map of Russian airstrikes in Syria (September 30-October 5) - Courtesy of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW)

 

Politics

That Putin has taken matters into his own hands is hardly surprising though. Relations between Moscow and the West are at a post-Cold War low in the wake of the contentious annexation/reclamation (depending on one’s point of view) of Crimea. Russia’s willingness to take a lone stand in international matters is a show of strength both for those at home and abroad, but aside from political one-upmanship Putin has sufficient incentive to take military action.

The missiles being fired at targets in Syria from Russian warships 1,500 km away in the Caspian Sea must to fly over Iranian and then Iraqi territory to reach their objectives – these countries are also key to the initiative to eliminate the extremists. Tehran is another strong ally of Moscow, and Iran’s regional influence has grown significantly in the last 18 months, and it holds considerable control in the corridors of power in Shia-majority Iraq.

Iranian and Kurdish fighters have so far been the most successful in stopping and reclaiming ground from militants in northern and western Iraq. With no sign yet of a major breakthrough on the ground though, Baghdad has now reportedly asked Russia to target militant-held locations in Iraq. Also buoyed by Russian involvement, on October 11, the Iraqi air force reported that it had carried out its own attack on an Islamic state convoy in the Anbar province, killing several of the group’s highest ranking members, but missing leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Defence

Syria is a long-time ally of Russia, and the ports of Latakia and Tartous are the country’s only foothold in the Mediterranean. Even from a purely selfish point of view then, Putin can claim to be looking after Russia’s own best interests, and the same can be said of the move to tackle the jihadists.

I understand from Russian diplomatic sources that several of those closest to Putin believe that jihadism is the single most significant threat to the country’s national security.

Russia has a longer history than most in dealing with Islamic separatism and extremism, having fought a war in Afghanistan and two with Chechnya and quelling uprisings in former Soviet republics in Central Asia, all within fairly recent memory.

In order to stop the expansion of the group’s influence, it will take a concerted and single-minded effort to cut off their revenue streams and thereby disincentivise sympathisers. It is therefore, little surprise that Russian and Western-backed coalition air attacks appear to have focused on the group’s infrastructure, including oilfields, pipelines and processing facilities expropriated from firms operating in Syria.

In addition, to ensure that the effort against the militants is unified, Putin may see the reported attacks on anti-Assad rebels as necessary to strengthen the government forces’ position prior to a major ground offensive. Russia is unlikely to take part in a ground offensive, but it has shown willingness to at least provide covering fire. As a result, Western-backed rebels will be looking to their sponsors for more funding and weaponry to fight back.

Economics

In a 2007 cable released by WikiLeaks, former US Ambassador to Syria, Michael Corbin admitted the comparative fruitlessness for international oil companies (IOCs) of doing business in Syria. “Senior managers of both Shell and PetroCanada in Syria have admitted … that their presence in Syria is due in part to its strategic location next to Iraq.” He added that the firms saw Syria as a platform to move into Iraq – “this includes training Syrian staff envisaged as a core of workers willing to work in Iraq once the market opens.”

Indeed, the onset of internal conflict in Syria in 2011 was enough for most firms active in the country to leave, and even the closeness of ties between Damascus and Moscow have not proved strong enough to keep Russian firms interested. Plans announced in late 2013 by private Russian firm SoyuzNefteGaz to explore a 2,190-square km area of Syria’s Mediterranean waters, made little progress, and the company’s chairman announced last month that the effort would be dropped. The conflict has driven oil production down from around 380,000 barrels per day to less than 10,000 bpd in four years.

It may be though, that with Iran’s impending return to global markets from the economic wilderness, Moscow sees the situation in Syria as an opportunity to work together with Tehran, thereby building political ties that could bear fruit for Russian companies. The country’s firms stand to benefit more than many others from the lifting of sanctions on the Islamic republic – likely in March or April next year. 

While Corbin’s conclusion was apt – “Economic considerations rarely, if ever, trump political interests in Syria” – the country may eventually prove to have been a litmus test for changing dynamics in the region.